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This paper compares the Canadian and U.S. wage structures by ﬁrm size. The objective is to
test for the possibility of diﬀerent returns to education and experience as well as examine the
role played by unmeasured skills in driving the allocation of workers across ﬁrms of diﬀerent
sizes. Those eﬀects may arise if large and small ﬁrms have diﬀerent working environments
in which the various dimensions of workers’ skills (measured and unmeasured) may not be
identically productive. The analysis is performed separately for the samples of unionised and
non unionised workers in order to isolate any eﬀects of unions on the size-wage structure.
The results show evidence of non random selection of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes
for both countries in both sectors. In the non unionised sector, the selection is found to be
strongly negative in large ﬁrms in both countries and positive in small ﬁrms. The observed
selection pattern implies that workers in large ﬁrms would be on average of lower quality in
terms of unmeasured aspects of skills whereas those in small ﬁrms would be of higher quality.
In addition, a decomposition of the size-wage gap shows that large ﬁrms tend to put more
weight on the valuation of measured skills (education and experience) than small ﬁrms do.
This pattern is robust to controlling for self selection, and in fact, once selectivity eﬀects are
incorporated it appears that rewards to measured skills constitute the main source of higher
wages in large ﬁrms. This ﬁnding combined with the result on the selection pattern is consistent
with an explanation of the diﬀerences in wage policies between large and small ﬁrms based on
diﬀerences in monitoring costs.
Finally, a comparison of the results for unionised and non unionised workers shows the
similarity in the selection pattern in both sectors for both countries. The similarity implies
that the non random selection of workers into large and small employers seems to operate
independently of the non random selection associated with union and non union status.
Keywords: Firm Size, Wage Structure, Non Random Selection, Education, Unmeasured
Skills.
JEL Classification: J24, J31, J51.1
1 Introduction
A largely documented stylised fact in the empirical literature on wage determination is that
large ﬁrms pay more than small ﬁrms for observationally equivalent workers. The estimated
size-wage premium is about 15% in the United States and 10% in Canada. Empirical studies
that investigate the source of this wage diﬀerential have analysed the explanatory power of
various factors related to workers and ﬁrm characteristics such as education, unionization and
industry type.1 Although some of these factors contribute to reducing the size-wage premium,
none can fully explain the gap and there remains a signiﬁcant unexplained wage premium for
workers in large ﬁrms. Furthermore, controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity using
ﬁxed-eﬀects does not signiﬁcantly reduce the estimated size-wage premium.
The methodology used in these studies consists of estimating a standard Mincer wage equa-
tion augmented by variables on ﬁrm and/or establishment size. This approach does not allow
for the possibility that human capital attributes may not be equally valued in large and small
ﬁrms. Large and small ﬁrms have diﬀerent working environments in which the various dimen-
sions of workers’ skills (measured and unmeasured) may not be identically productive. For
instance, large ﬁrms present more opportunities for promotion and career development which
may attract workers with high unobserved ability. Ability would then play an important role
in sorting workers into positions leading to individual wage diﬀerences based on unmeasured
aspects of skills. 2 On the other hand, measured and unmeasured aspects of skills may be
valued diﬀerently by large and small ﬁrms due to diﬀerences in monitoring costs. Larger ﬁrms
may have high costs of monitoring and may prefer to reward skills that are directly observable
(like education and experience) relative to small ﬁrms. 3 These kinds of eﬀects can result in
diﬀerent returns to both measured and unmeasured dimensions of human capital between large
and small ﬁrms although it is not clear, a priori, what the overall eﬀect on wage proﬁles in
small versus large ﬁrms ought to be.
This paper analyzes whether and to what extent ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes have diﬀerent wage
structures. The objective is to study the possibility that ﬁrm size aﬀects wages through the
non random selection process of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent size. The paper concentrates on
1See Oi and Idson (1999) for a review of the literature on ﬁrm size and wages in the U.S. and Morissette
(1993) for a study of the Canadian case.
2See Gibbons (1998) for a review of the empirical literature on wage dynamics within organizations and
evidence of fast-tracks. Reilly (1993) ﬁnds that controlling for computer access signiﬁcantly reduces the impact
of establishment size on wages which suggests that unobserved dimensions of human capital may play an
important role in explaining diﬀerences in wage outcomes across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
3See Garen (1985) for a theoretical model exhibiting this prediction.2
Canadian and U.S ﬁrms, using cross-sectional data from the Labour Force Survey for Canada
and the March Current Population Survey for United States for the year 1998.
Persistent size-wage gaps, as well as diﬀerent wage proﬁles by ﬁrm size, can coexist with
competitive labour markets if workers sort themselves into ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes based on
unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics. The statistical framework in this paper is
based on a Roy model 4, in which diﬀerent skills (measured and unmeasured) are not equally
productive in small and large ﬁrms. Utility maximizing workers, in this framework, choose the
size of employer for which their abilities are best suited. This results in a particular distribution
of skills across ﬁrms of diﬀerent size and in diﬀerent wage structures by ﬁrm size. This paper
estimates such a model and tests whether the predicted diﬀerences in wage structure by ﬁrm
size can be found in the data as well as whether or not the underlying mechanism of self
selection based on unobservables provides a good explanation of any such diﬀerences.
The existing literature has found size-wage gaps in both Canada and the U.S. As a result, it
is interesting to investigate whether wage proﬁles by ﬁrm size are also similar in both countries.
However, in undertaking this exercise, it is important to note that there may be some important
diﬀerences between labour markets in Canada and the U.S. In particular, unions exert more
inﬂuence over the labour market in Canada than is the case in the United States (Freeman
(1980), DiNardo and Lemieux (1997)). How might this impact the wage structures of small
and large ﬁrms? Unions tend to reduce the part of the remuneration that reward individual
measured and unmeasured skills (Lemieux 1993), and are more concentrated in large ﬁrms
(Maranto (1988) and Martinello and Meng (1992)). As a result of these eﬀects, it is important
to allow for the possibility of diﬀerent size-wage eﬀects in unionised and non-unionised ﬁrms.
Idson and Feaster (1990) analyze the size-wage premium correcting for worker self-selection
applying a similar framework to a sample of U.S ﬁrms drawn from the 1979 May CPS. Although
their analysis focuses primarily on improving estimates of the size-wage gap, they brieﬂy present
some results which support the idea that ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes have diﬀerent wage policies
in which measured and unmeasured skills are diﬀerently rewarded. They also ﬁnd evidence
of non random selection. That is, that an unobservable or unmeasured trait drives workers’
choices between working in large or small ﬁrms. As it is not their main interest, Idson and
Feaster do not investigate their ﬁndings on diﬀerences in wage structure by ﬁrm size in any
detail. Furthermore they restrict their attention to non-unionised ﬁrms.
4See Roy (1951) for the motivation of the model and Neal and Rosen (1998) for more details on selection
models and their implications for earnings distribution.3
Pearce (1990) analyzes diﬀerences in the returns to tenure among large and small employers
as well as the role of unions in inﬂuencing the employer-size wage relationship. Also using data
from the CPS of May 1979, he ﬁnds evidence of a smaller size-wage gap in the union sector and
of steeper tenure proﬁles in larger employers where workers are not unionised. His analysis
however does not consider the possibility that workers endogenously choose the size of the
ﬁrms for which they work and the resulting self-selection of workers into employers of diﬀerent
sizes.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents a cross-country
analysis of the size-wage gap in the same spirit as the existing literature. Section 3 describes
the framework of analysis based on a model of non random allocation of workers into ﬁrms of
diﬀerent sizes and presents the estimation method. Section 4 presents the results and section
5 concludes the paper.
2 Data
This section presents the variables and sample selection procedures used for the LFS and the
March CPS. 5 It also compares the size-wage gaps for the two countries estimated according
to the methodology used in the existing literature.
2.1 Variables and Sample Selection
Whenever possible, variables in both data sets are deﬁned similarly. Since education is re-
ported categorically in both surveys, the following four categories are utilised: university, post
secondary, secondary and no diploma for Canada, and for the U.S., college, associate college,
high school and less than high school. 6 Because age is reported categorically in the LFS,
dummies for age are used for both countries. Other variables similar in both data sets include
gender, race, marital status, occupation and industry dummies. For ﬁrm size, a dummy indi-
cating that the ﬁrm has more than 500 employees at all locations has been created to deﬁne
large ﬁrms for both countries.
5Descriptive statistics on the main variables used in the two data sets are presented in Appendix Tables A1.a
and A1.b respectively.
6For Canada, the “no diploma” category includes individual reporting partial secondary or without diploma.
In the CPS, the category “associate college” corresponds to associate degree-occupational/vocational or associate
degree-academic program. Also individuals reporting some college but no degree are included in the “high
school” category.4
The main diﬀerence between the two surveys is that the LFS provides information on
establishment size in addition to ﬁrm size. Given that both variables may have a diﬀerent
impact on wage outcomes, the information on establishment size will be used for Canada in
parallel with the cross-country analysis. The LFS also contains worker’s tenure in his/her
current job which is not available in the March CPS survey. Potential experience will be
used instead for cross-country comparisons. Finally, wages are given on an hourly basis for
all workers in the LFS. Hourly wages are computed for the U.S. based on the information on
usual hours worked per week. 7
The ﬁnal sample consists of individuals aged between 20 and 65 working full-time. I have
excluded the self-employed as well as workers in the construction for which ﬁrm size eﬀects
are not relevant. The number of observations is 69521 for Canada and 28117 for the United
States.
2.2 Employer-Size Wage Diﬀerentials
Recent empirical studies on the determinants of wage and wage growth have analysed possible
departures from the basic Mincer-type wage equation that includes education and a quadratic
in experience. Since the wage equation is originally derived from a model of optimal investment
in human capital, it does not oﬀer a complete representation of the labour market as it only
describes the supply side of the market. These studies add variables that describe and capture
variations in wages related to the demand side of the labour market to the wage equation. In
particular, industry, occupation, unionization and ﬁrm size dummies are the main variables
employed.
This section presents the results of a cross-sectional OLS estimation of employer-size wage
diﬀerentials for the two countries in the spirit of the empirical literature on ﬁrm size and wage
outcomes. I replicate the estimation of the size-wage gap using data from the LFS and CPS for
1998 by regressing the log of wages on a dummy variable characterizing large ﬁrms and adding
control variables to see how they aﬀect the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on
ﬁrm size. Results for both countries are reported in Table 1, columns (I) to (V). Note that for
Canada, columns (VI) and (VII) show the results with additional controls for establishment
size and worker tenure.
7The CPS contains several questions related to hourly, weekly or yearly wages. I have combined the infor-
mation from the three diﬀerent sources to compute hourly wages. For individuals reporting only yearly wages,
I divided wages by 51 weeks times the reported number of usual hours worked per week.5
Overall, the results are similar to those found previously in the literature on the size wage
gap. Column (I) shows the average size-wage gap in the absence of worker or ﬁrm controls. The
coeﬃcient associated with the dummy for large ﬁrms (more than 500 employees) gives a wage
diﬀerential of 0.20 for Canada and 0.24 for the U.S. In terms of percentage, the diﬀerence in
wages between large and small ﬁrms is 22.1% for Canada and is 27.9% for the United States. 8
The coeﬃcients are similar to those estimated in Morissette (1993) using the Canadian Labour
Market Activity Survey (LMAS) for 1986 and in Oi and Idson (1999) who use the May 1983
CPS. This suggests that the magnitude of the gaps has not changed over time in either country.
Column (II) presents the results when education and experience are added to the log wage
equation. The size of the coeﬃcients associated with ﬁrm size drops substantially for both
countries compared to column (I) revealing that part of the size wage gap can be explained by
human capital diﬀerences across workers employed by large and small ﬁrms.
Introducing the eﬀect of union membership 9 in column (III), does not change the size-wage
premium in the U.S. case, whereas the gap is substantially reduced in Canada. The addition
of industries and occupations (columns (IV) and (V)) reduces the eﬀects of ﬁrm size leaving an
estimated wage diﬀerential of 0.076 (7.9%) for Canada and 0.133 (14.3%) for the U.S.. Note
that the addition of worker and ﬁrm characteristics reduced the size wage gap for Canada by
about 65% (compared to column (I)) whereas the same types of controls reduced the U.S. gap
by about 46%.
Columns (VI) and (VII) for Canada show the eﬀects of introducing establishment size and
tenure on the size-wage gap. The coeﬃcient associated with ﬁrm size drops substantially when
establishment size is controlled for but remains signiﬁcant. The introduction of a quadratic
function of tenure in column (VII) reduces the impact of potential experience and slightly
reduces the impact of ﬁrm size. The estimated establishment size wage gap amounts to a wage
diﬀerential of 11.9%, controlling for ﬁrm size, tenure, occupation and industry. The signiﬁcant
impacts of both ﬁrm and establishment size is found in the U.S. case by Brown and Medoﬀ
(89).
Overall, the results for both countries are consistent with those found in the literature
based on other cross-sectional data sets. After controlling for worker and ﬁrm characteristics,
workers earn about 14% more in large (more than 500 employees) U.S. ﬁrms and about 8%
more in large Canadian ﬁrms.
8These percentages corresponds to the anti-log of the regression coeﬃcient minus one.
9The dummy for union membership also includes workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.6
This paper considers the possibility that, in additions to paying diﬀerent wages on average,
small and large ﬁrms reward diﬀerent worker characteristics diﬀerently. The next section
presents an analytical framework based on the non random allocation of workers into large
and small ﬁrms and describes the estimation method used to estimate and test these ideas.
3 Analytical Framework
The main diﬃculty in the analysis of wage determination is that wages are determined in
an equilibrium context. Any empirical analysis, therefore, has to deal with disentangling the
eﬀects of simultaneous movements in labour supply and demand on wage outcomes. However,
the literature on assignment and the distribution of earnings, ﬁrst studied by Roy (1951)
and later developed by Sattinger (1975, 1993), provides a mechanism by which wages do not
depend on workers and ﬁrms characteristics independently, but on the value that a particular
skill takes on when assigned to a particular job or ﬁrm. In this framework, workers are not
identically productive across ﬁrms with production technologies that are diﬀerently sensitive
to workers’ skills. This paper examines the assumption that the sensitivity of the technology
with respect to skills varies with the number of workers. This implies that workers are not
identically productive in large and small ﬁrms.
This section describes a model of non random assignment of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent
size based on both measured and unmeasured aspects of worker skill. It then discusses the
implications of the model regarding the structure of wages in ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
Assume there are two types of ﬁrms which diﬀer by size. Firms are indexed by j = S(small),
L(large). The only input is labour, given in eﬃciency units per worker. Workers, indexed by
i = 1,...,N, are characterised by a vector of productive skills, (SKi,θi), where SKi denotes
observed skills and θi represents skills that are unmeasured by the econometrician (these could
include innate ability, initiative, ambition, loyalty). The production technology of ﬁrm j






i(SKi)αj(θi)βj, j = S,L (1)
where Nj is the total number of employees in ﬁrm j and n
j
i is the number of employees of in
10It is assumed that ﬁrms of diﬀerent size have diﬀerent production technologies in terms of the sensitivity to
the skills required. The fact that both have constant returns to scale simpliﬁes the analysis. Other assumptions
on returns to scale would involve ﬁnding the optimal size for both ﬁrms which is beyond the scope of this paper.7
ﬁrm j endowed with (SKi,θi). There is one output the price of which is normalised to one.
The proﬁt maximizing condition for both types of ﬁrms implies the following conditions on the









The wage oﬀered by large and small ﬁrms will therefore be, in log form:
lnwL
i = αLlnSKi + βLlnθi, for large ﬁrms (3)
lnwS
i = αSlnSKi + βSlnθi, for small ﬁrms (4)
On the workers’ side, it is assumed that workers skills (SKi,θi) are exogenously given so
that investment in human capital is ignored. Workers are utility maximizers and the utility
associated with working in a large or small ﬁrm is assumed to depend on ﬁrm attributes that
are size-speciﬁc such as the wage rate and the working environment.
Workers choose to work at a large (small) ﬁrm because they have a comparative advantage
in that type of ﬁrm. Let V
j
i denote the (indirect) utility of working in a ﬁrm of size j. Deﬁne
Zi as a vector of individual characteristics that aﬀect the utility of being in a large (or small
ﬁrm), the indirect utility function of worker i is given by:
lnV
j
i = ψ0 + ψ1lnw
j
i + ψ2jZi
= ψ0 + ψ1αjlnSKi + ψ2jZi + ψ1βjlnθi, j = L,S (5)
where (5) results from substituting the wage equation oﬀered by large or small ﬁrm into
equation (8).
A worker chooses to work at a large ﬁrm if his utility is maximised by such a choice, that
is if V L
i > V S
i . Utility is not directly observed but the net gains associated with the choice of,
let’s say, a large ﬁrm is represented by:
lnV L
i > lnV S
i ↔ ψ1(αL − αS)lnSKi + (ψ2L − ψ2S)Zi + i > 0 (6)
where i = ψ1(βL − βS)lnθi is an individual speciﬁc term aﬀecting utility. Representing the
net gain from choosing a large ﬁrm by the latent variable U∗
i , a worker’s assignment into a8
large or small ﬁrm corresponds to the following conditions:
Worker i chooses L ↔ U∗
i > 0 ↔ φ1lnSKi + φ2Zi + i > 0
Worker i chooses S ↔ U∗
i ≤ 0 ↔ φ1lnSKi + φ2Zi + i ≤ 0 (7)
where φ1 = ψ1(αL−αS) and φ2 = ψ2L−ψ2S. The assignment of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent
size and the wages received will therefore be given by the following allocation rule: A worker
with endowment (SKi,θi) chooses a large ﬁrm if and only if:
U∗
i > 0 ↔ lnθi > g(lnSKi,φ2/φ1Zi)
This inequality deﬁnes the conditional distribution of the worker’s innate ability, θi, given SKi
across ﬁrm size.
This framework emphasizes the notion that diﬀerent workers have diﬀerent comparative
advantages in ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. This idea is relevant when analyzing the returns to skills
across ﬁrm size and the role of unmeasured aspects of skills in driving the workers’ allocation
into ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The current empirical literature, however, has not yet analysed
and questioned the importance of this idea in explaining the size-wage relationship. The next
section presents the estimation method used to test the possibility of diﬀerent wage structures
by ﬁrm size and the role of unmeasured ability.
3.1 Estimation Method
The framework introduced in the previous section corresponds to a switching regression model
with endogenous switching that can be summarised by the following set of equations: 11
lnwL
i = XiγL + uiL (8)
lnwS
i = XiγS + uiS (9)
U∗
i = Wiδ + i (10)
where uiL = βLlnθi
uiS = βSlnθi
i = ψ1(βL − βS)lnθi (11)
11See Maddala (1983) for a review of switching regression models.9
The matrix X stands for workers’ measured human capital such as education, a quadratic
function of experience, marital status, gender and race. It also contains dummies for occupa-
tion, industry and large city to control for compensating wage diﬀerentials. W contains the
variables in X as well as the variables in Z which aﬀect the selection process. Distributional
assumption on the vector of error terms and the correlation between uiL,uiS and i deﬁne the
selectivity term, commonly called the inverse Mills ratio, to be added to the wage equation.
More precisely, denote by σL and σS the covariance between  and uiL and uiS respectively.
Assuming normality of the vector of error terms deﬁned in (11), the mean wage of workers in
large (small) ﬁrms given that they chose to work in a large (small) ﬁrm is:
E[lnwL
i |U∗
i > 0] = XiγL + E[uiL|i < Wiδ]










Signiﬁcant estimates of σL and σS can be interpreted as evidence of non random selection
of workers into large and small ﬁrms. Although the magnitude of the covariances does not
have a direct interpretation, their sign reﬂects the selection process. Given that the selection
equation characterizes the choice of large ﬁrms, positive selection into large ﬁrms corresponds
to σL > 0 and positive selection into small ﬁrms is implied by σS < 0. Positive selection in
large ﬁrms is equivalent to saying that workers who chose to work in large ﬁrms are better
than average workers in terms of unmeasured dimensions of skills. This would occur if large
ﬁrms assign positive reward to these unmeasured skills. 12 The reasoning is equivalent for
small ﬁrms.
An advantage of this framework is that it does not impose restrictions on the direction of
the selection of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent size. That is, the covariances σL and σS can
be of similar or opposite signs implying either positive selection in both large and small ﬁrms
(σL > 0 and σS < 0) or positive (negative) selection into large ﬁrms and negative (positive)
selection in small ﬁrms corresponding to σL > 0 (σL < 0) and σS > 0 (σS < 0). 13 A test
of diﬀerences in the wage structures between large and small ﬁrms in terms of evaluation of
unmeasured skills requires σL and σS to be signiﬁcant in both wage equations and to have
12Negative selection has the opposite interpretation. In this case, large ﬁrms would not assign a positive
reward to unmeasured aspects of skills.
13The case where σL < 0 and σS > 0 is not possible by deﬁnition of σL and σS. See Maddala (1977a) for
details.10
identical signs.
The estimation is performed using the Heckman two-step method as follows. In a ﬁrst
step a probit model is used to estimate the probability that a worker chooses a large ﬁrm
and computes the resulting inverse Mills ratio. The second step estimates the wage proﬁles
augmented by the inverse Mills ratio. The resulting estimations provide information on the
potentially diﬀerential eﬀects of education and experience on wages in small and large ﬁrms as
well as on the eﬀect of the inverse Mills ratio in each case. In this paper, the inverse Mills ratio
has an interpretation that goes beyond the so-called selectivity term because by the deﬁnitions
given in (11), it provides a proxy for unmeasured individual-speciﬁc ability θi.
Identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcient associated with the inverse Mills ratio in the wage equation is
obtained through nonlinearities implied by the use of the normal distribution for the estimation.
Using all the explanatory variables in the wage equation as explanatory variables in the probit
selection equation implies non linearities that allows identiﬁcation of the inverse Mills ratio in
the wage equation. For that matter, the vector Zi deﬁned earlier is composed of the set of
explanatory variables Xi usually employed in the wage equation. 14
Exclusion restrictions can also be used for identiﬁcation of the parameters. This method
consists in choosing variables that aﬀect the selection process but do not directly aﬀect the
worker’s individual wage. A variable that satisﬁes the exclusion restriction would be correlated
with the worker’s choice of ﬁrm size without directly aﬀecting the worker’s wage. As a possible
variable satisfying these requirements, I use interactions between the worker’s industry and
city size.
Table 2 below shows that there is a positive correlation between ﬁrm and city size, suggest-
ing that large ﬁrms are commonly found in large cities and small ﬁrms in small cities. There
is, however, substantial variation in this correlation across diﬀerent industries. This suggests
that a worker living in a large city would on average be more likely to ﬁnd work in a large ﬁrm
(than a worker in a small city). The chances of such a worker ﬁnding work in a large ﬁrm,
however, would vary with the worker’s industry. This suggests that interacting industry and
city size would be useful as a predictor of ﬁrm size, over and above the information contained
in city size or industry considered independently.
14The variables in the wage equation are education, a quadratic in experience, gender, marital status, occu-
pation and industry and city size.11
Table 2: Correlations of Firm Size with City Size Workeda
Correlation Canada United States
Coeﬃcientsb Large Firm Large Firm
Large City 0.017*** 0.052***
Large City by Industry:
Primary 0.020 0.036
Durables -0.099*** -0.193***
Non Durables -0.052*** 0.023
Transport 0.104*** 0.149***
Trade Wholesale 0.033 0.091**
Trade Retail 0.097*** 0.010
Finance 0.037* 0.127***
Services -0.003 0.053***
Civil Service 0.021 0.118***
a-Firm size is deﬁned as a dummy for ﬁrms with more than 500 employees. City size is
deﬁned as a dummy equal to one for more than 500 thousands individuals in the U.S. case and for
Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal in Canada.
b-***= 1% level, **= 5% level, *= 10% level of signiﬁcance.
In order to be valid as an exclusion restriction, the interaction of industry and city size must
meet the further condition of having no direct eﬀect on wages. It is well known that there are
wage premia associated with industry (Dickens and Katz 1987, Krueger and Summers 1988)
as well as an urban wage premium (Glaeser and Mar´ e (2001)). There is no reason, however,
to expect that the urban wage premium should depend on industry. In other words, it seems
reasonable to think that a worker in the transportation sector living in a large city would earn
the same urban wage premium as a worker in the services sector living in a large city.15
Appendix B attempts to test the reasonableness of this assumption. The results of the test
suggest that, in fact, the urban wage premium is the same across most industries.16
15This would be the case if the urban wage premium was the result of compensating diﬀerentials reﬂecting
the higher costs of living in a large city and other urban disamenities.
16Interestingly, the test suggests that where there are diﬀerential urban wage premia by industry, they occur
in the durable and non-durable sectors in Canada and the non-durable sector in the U.S. These are exactly those
sectors in which the correlation between city and ﬁrm size is signiﬁcant and negative. The results reported on
section 4.2 are largely robust to including the interactions associated to these particular industries in the wage
equations though the signiﬁcance of the selectivity terms is weakened.12
4 Results
This section presents the results of the analysis of the size-wage structure in three parts. In
section 4.1, the possibility of diﬀerent returns to skills by ﬁrm size is analysed using OLS estima-
tions of hourly wages (in log) on education dummies and potential experience both interacted
with a dummy indicating whether the individual works in a large ﬁrm (more than 500 employ-
ees). Tests of equality of the returns to education and experience between large and small ﬁrms
are performed based on the χ2 statistic. In section 4.2, endogeneity in ﬁrm size and the impact
of workers self-selection on wage outcomes are analysed using the Heckman two-step method
following the analytical framework presented in section 3. Section 4.3 further investigates the
role of self-selection on the size-wage structure by studying the respective contributions of mea-
sured skills and self-selection in explaining the size-wage structure. This analysis is based on
the decomposition of the size-wage gap following the Oaxaca/Blinder method. In each section,
a separate analysis for unionised and non unionised workers is performed to isolate the impact
of unions on the size-wage structure.
4.1 Size-wage Structure and Measured Skills
This section describes the results of the analysis of the size-wage structure for measured skills
for Canada and the United States where returns to education and potential experience are
estimated and a test of equality of the returns between large and small ﬁrms is performed. The
results are presented in table table 3. While there is evidence of signiﬁcantly diﬀerent wage
structures in large versus small employers in both Canada and the U.S., the wage-education and
wage-experience proﬁles by ﬁrm size diﬀer across countries. In the U.S., potential experience
seems to be signiﬁcantly more rewarded in larger employers. Staying an additional year in a
large ﬁrm brings an estimated average of 3.4% increase in salary in large ﬁrms but only 2.6%
in small ﬁrms. On the other hand, there is only weak evidence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the returns to education between large and small ﬁrms. For Canada, there are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the valuation of additional years of experience by ﬁrm size. There are however
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the returns to university, post secondary and no secondary education
between large and small ﬁrms. The test of the diﬀerences in returns shows a value of the χ2
statistics of 9.97 for university and of 19.37 for no secondary education which is well above the13
value of 5.4 for a test at the 1% conﬁdence level. The percentage diﬀerential in wages between
large and small ﬁrms is about 9% for workers without secondary education and about 5% for
workers holding a university diploma.
It is interesting to note that the returns to holding a university diploma in Canada are
lower in large than in small ﬁrms. Given the tendency for unions to compress individual wage
diﬀerentials like those arising from diﬀerences in level of education, a possible interpretation for
this ﬁnding is the higher concentration of unions in large ﬁrms. From the descriptive statistics
of the Canadian data (shown in Appendix A1) 50.2% of large ﬁrms are unionised compared to
only 27.4% of small ﬁrms. To isolate union eﬀects Tables 4.a and 4.b replicate the analysis for
both countries separately for non unionised and unionised workers respectively.
From Table 4.a, one can see that the cross-country diﬀerences in the size-wage structure
mostly disappear when the sample of non unionised workers is used. In both countries, there
is evidence of a diﬀerent wage structure in large and small ﬁrms in that experience is rewarded
more in large ﬁrms. This result suggests that ﬁrm-worker matches of higher quality tend to
last longer in large ﬁrms. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the way large and small ﬁrms
reward education in the U.S. case and evidence of higher returns to a university diploma and
lower returns to no secondary education in large (non unionised) ﬁrms in the Canadian case,
with a percentage diﬀerential in wages of about 5% in each case.
The results for the sample of unionised workers, presented in table 4b, are similar to the
Canadian results from table 3. This is consistent with the earlier conjecture on the impact
of unions on wage outcomes in Canada. Among unionised workers, the return to holding a
university diploma relative to no secondary education is signiﬁcantly higher in small ﬁrms (by
a 9% percentage diﬀerential in wages). Indeed, workers holding a university diploma earn
on average 35.3% more than workers with no secondary education in small unionised ﬁrms
while the percentage premium for university education in large unionised ﬁrms is only 25.9%.
The diﬀerence earn on average The results for the U.S., although not signiﬁcant given the
smaller sample size 17, show similar diﬀerences in coeﬃcients for college education between
large and small ﬁrms as Canada. These results suggest that small unionised employers face
17The small sample size results from the fact that the March CPS survey interviews only one of the rotational
groups identiﬁed in the design of the monthly CPS. For that reason, a smaller percentage of that population
is unionised compared to the overall average of 20% usually observed in the literature. An analysis based on
several years of the March CPS data will be performed in the rest of the paper to increase the precision of the
analysis and allow comparisons with the Canadian case.14
lower pressures than large ones, allowing them to maintain education wage diﬀerentials.
Overall, this ﬁrst series of results shows that the size-wage structure in the non unionised
sector is similar in Canada and the United States with strong evidence of higher returns to po-
tential experience in large ﬁrms and no substantial evidence of diﬀerential returns to education
in large and small ﬁrms. The signiﬁcant diﬀerences found in the returns to experience between
large and small ﬁrms in both countries suggests that it may be worthwhile to investigate the
role that unmeasured skills may play in explaining the size-wage structure in both countries.
Unionised ﬁrms exhibit diﬀerent patterns. The key observation is that the estimated returns
to higher education are higher in small unionised employers relative to large unionised ﬁrms. 18
The objective of the next section is to see whether these results hold when one introduces the
idea of workers non random selection into large and small ﬁrms.
4.2 Size-wage Structure and Non random Selection
This section investigates the existence of non random selection in the allocation of workers into
ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The analysis is performed separately over the sample of non unionised
workers in the private sector 19 and for unionised workers. The results are presented in tables
5a and 5b respectively. The ﬁrst two columns of each table give the results of separate log
wage equations for large and small ﬁrms without correction for self-selection. The next two
columns present the results with the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio. 20
For the sample of non unionised workers (see table 5a), the results for both countries are
similar in terms of the sign and magnitude of the selection terms. Both terms are signiﬁcant
in large and small ﬁrms suggesting evidence of non random selection of workers into large and
small ﬁrms. Based on the speciﬁcation of the selection model and the resulting wage equations
given in equations (12) and (13), in both countries there is evidence of negative selection in
18Note that including information on establishment size and tenure available in the LFS reduces the magnitude
of the coeﬃcients on education and experience but do not change the overall results for Canada in either the
unionised and non unionised samples. The results are not shown but available upon request.
19Following the literature on the size-wage gap, the analysis is performed over the sample of workers in the
private sector to minimize possible union threat eﬀects that may play a role that is expected to be stronger
in the public sector. Results over the sample of both private and public non unionised workers are similar to
those presented in the paper. This suggests that, as in the analysis of the size-wage gap, the idea of threat of
unionization does not seem to aﬀect the size-wage structure.
20All these results identify the selectivity terms through the use of the exclusion restrictions. As discussed in
section 3, the results are largely robust to the inclusion of some interaction terms in the wage equations, though
signiﬁcance of the selectivity estimates in small ﬁrms is reduced.15
large ﬁrms and positive selection in small ﬁrms. This implies that workers in large ﬁrms would
be on average of lower quality in terms of unmeasured aspects of skills whereas those in small
ﬁrms would be of higher quality.
Table 5b presents the results for the sample of unionised workers. For Canada, there is
evidence of negative selection into large ﬁrms and positive selection into small ﬁrms implying
that the selection patterns are similar in both unionised and non unionised cases for Canada. 21
In the U.S. case the results for the unionised sector are generally more imprecisely estimated
due to the much smaller sample size. There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the inverse Mills ratio
in the wage equation for large ﬁrms and weak evidence of positive selection into small ﬁrms.
Although the selectivity term is not signiﬁcant, it is largely negative and similar to the one
observed in the non unionised case. To investigate further the wage structure for unionised
workers and allow comparisons with the Canadian case, I performed the same analysis over the
three years of the March CPS data pooled together with controls for year dummies. The results
are shown in appendix C both for non unionised and unionised U.S. workers. Interestingly,
the results are very similar to the Canadian case in terms of the selection patterns.
In both the unionised and non unionised sectors, the returns to higher education fall in both
countries whenever the estimation controls for self-selection. Not surprisingly given the unions
compression eﬀects the distribution of individual wages, the reduction in the education wage
diﬀerentials in both large and small ﬁrms is more pronounced when the analysis is performed
over the sample of unionised workers. This observation raises the question of whether important
diﬀerences in the returns to education between large and small ﬁrms remain once selection is
controlled for. If these diﬀerences remain, do they constitute a large part of the size wage
gap compared to the eﬀect due to the selection terms? The next subsection addresses these
questions.
4.3 Size Wage Gap Decomposition
In this subsection, the possibility that large and small ﬁrms establish diﬀerent wage policies
with respect to workers’ measured and unmeasured skills is analysed. Given the analytical
21When tenure is included in the estimation, tenure eﬀects are reduced after inclusion of the selectivity term
in both large and small ﬁrms wage equations. Experience eﬀects slightly increase in large ﬁrms. The results are
not shown but available upon request.16
framework presented in section 3, one can interpret the inverse Mills ratios in each wage equa-
tion as proxies for any diﬀerences in the wage structure between large and small ﬁrms resulting
form unmeasured aspects of skills. The objective of the analysis hereafter is to analyse the
simultaneous contributions to the size-wage structure of measured and unmeasured skills. The
method used to emphasized the role that each of these components plays in explaining the
size-wage structure is the Oaxaca/Blinder wage decomposition. Following the Oaxaca/Blinder
method, the average size-wage gap can be decomposed into the following :
WLK − WSK = ΣK[ (XLK − XSK)βLK | {z }
Diﬀerence in Endowments
+ (βLK − βSK)XSK | {z }
Diﬀerence in Betas or Price
], K = U,NU (14)
Where K = U,NU indexes the unionised and non unionised sectors respectively, W.K is
the average wage in large or small ﬁrms in sector K, X.K is the vector of average workers’
characteristics in sector K and the betas are estimated from separate ols regressions of log
wages on the X characteristics for large and small ﬁrms. The ﬁrst term corresponds to the
part of the size-wage gap that is due to diﬀerences in the composition of the workforce in
large and small ﬁrms while the second one describes diﬀerences in the evaluation of workers
characteristics between large and small companies. Any diﬀerences in wage policies between
large and small ﬁrms will therefore be characterised by the sign and magnitude of the second
term. In addition, this type of analysis allows one to further investigate the contribution to the
size-wage gap of each individual variable related to measured skills (education and experience)
and unmeasured skills (the inverse Mills ratio) when the average size-wage gap is computed
from the unconditional mean (including non random selection). Indeed, the previous formula
can be further decomposed into the following:






Where λLK and λSK represents the inverse Mills ratios associated with the choice of large and
small ﬁrms in sector K. The idea is to see how much of the size-wage gap can be attributed to
diﬀerences in the composition of the workforce versus diﬀerences in the valuation of workers
skills in large and small companies and examine whether these respective contributions are
aﬀected by the inclusion of the selection eﬀect.17
The results for both countries in the non unionised private sector case are presented in
table 6a where in the ﬁrst three columns, the wage gap decomposition is computed without
correction for self-selection. Looking ﬁrst at the decomposition of the overall size-wage gap
(row labelled “All”) for Canada and the U.S., one can notice that whether or not self-selection
is introduced, the diﬀerences in the valuation of education and experience explain a higher
proportion of the gap than diﬀerences in the composition of the workforce across large and
small ﬁrms. The positive signs reﬂect the fact that the valuation of these measured skills is
higher in large ﬁrms. Consistent with the nature of the selection pattern observed in section
4.2, that lower quality workers tend to gravitate toward large ﬁrms, the results, controlling for
selectivity, suggest that the actual diﬀerence in the valuation of measured skills between large
and small ﬁrms is greater than implied by the estimates that ignore the selectivity eﬀect. In
other words, once the fact that large ﬁrms have workers with lower quality along unobserved
dimensions is taken into account, it appears that the higher wages paid by large ﬁrms on
average are due to the fact that large ﬁrms reward measured skills much more strongly than
do small ﬁrms.
We can reﬁne this decomposition so as to measure the contributions of the individual
variables that represent measured skills (i.e. education and experience) and can examine the
eﬀect of controlling for self selection of workers on the estimates of these contributions. The
main empirical regularity, which can be observed by comparing column 3 to column 6, is that
once selectivity is controlled for the contribution of each of the measured skill in explaining the
size-wage gap increases. This ﬁnding is consistent with Garen (1985) who explains diﬀerences
in the returns to skills in large and small ﬁrms using a model in which higher monitoring costs
in large companies lead them to reward workers based on more easily measurable skills like
education or experience. The results in the present paper seem to conﬁrm this prediction in
that, after controlling for self-selection, the estimated premium paid by large ﬁrms to measure
skills, education and experience, increases.
Interestingly, diﬀerences in workforce composition seem most important in explaining the
size-wage gap for college educated workers and workers with no secondary schooling. For
workers with intermediate levels of education, on the other hand, diﬀerences in wages (across
large and small ﬁrms) seem to be driven by diﬀerences in the valuation of these skills (i.e.
diﬀerent wage policies). These observations are robust to, and actually exacerbated by inclusion18
of controls for selectivity.
The results for the sample of unionised workers are presented in table 6b and are fairly simi-
lar to the results for non unionized workers. As before, diﬀerences in the valuation of education
and experience explain a higher proportion of the gap than diﬀerences in the composition of
the workforce. Again the results, controlling for selectivity, suggest that the actual diﬀerence
in the valuation of measured skills between large and small ﬁrms is greater than implied by
the estimates that ignore the selectivity eﬀect. The overall size-wage gap, as well as the gaps
associated with education and experience, like the size-wage gap for college educated workers,
systematically smaller than those computed over the sample of non unionised workers. This is
consistent with the tendency for unions to reduce wage inequalities.
Also, as before, diﬀerences in workforce composition seem most important in explaining
the size-wage gap for college educated workers (in Canada) and workers with no secondary
schooling (in both countries). For unionized college educated workers in the U.S, however,
diﬀerences in the valuation of a college education between large and small ﬁrms appears to
be more important than workforce composition eﬀects. For workers with intermediate levels
of education, on the other hand, diﬀerences in wages (across large and small ﬁrms) seem to
be driven by diﬀerences in the valuation of these skills (i.e. diﬀerent wage policies), although
workforce composition eﬀects also appear to be important for high school educated workers in
the U.S. case. As before, these observations are robust to inclusion of controls for selectivity.
Overall, there is strong evidence of non random allocation of workers into large and small
ﬁrms in both Canada and the United States. 22 The selection pattern, that workers with high
quality along unobserved dimensions self select into smaller ﬁrms, is similar for both countries
and consistent with earlier ﬁndings by Idson and Feaster (1990) who used U.S. data from the
May CPS for the year 1979. This suggests that the selection pattern has been stable over time.
From the nature of the selection pattern, with evidence of negative selection in large ﬁrms and
positive selection in small ﬁrms, one can also conclude that small employers seem to reward
unmeasured aspects of skills as captured by the positive eﬀect of the inverse Mills ratio while
large companies do not seem to reward such skills as highly. Examples of these unmeasured
skills may include a propensity to operate in a work environment that is more prone to fast
22Note that the ﬁndings are robust to dropping the exclusion restrictions and identifying the selectivity terms
through non linearities implied by the use of the normal distribution although the estimates of positive selection
in small ﬁrms becomes only weakly signiﬁcant. The results are available upon request.19
changes, or dimensions of ability related to creativity and autonomy in decision taking.
5 Conclusion
This paper compares U.S. and Canadian wage structures by ﬁrm size using cross-sectional
data from the Labour Force Survey for Canada and the March Current Population Survey for
United States for the year 1998. It is assumed that large and small ﬁrms have diﬀerent working
environments in which the various dimensions of workers’ skills (measured and unmeasured)
may not be identically productive. The objective is to test for the possibility of diﬀerent
returns to education and experience as well as examine the role played by unmeasured skills
in driving the allocation of workers across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
The results show evidence of non random selection of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes
for both countries in both sectors. In the non unionised sector, the selection is found to be
strongly negative in large ﬁrms in both countries and positive in small ﬁrms. The observed
selection pattern implies that workers in large ﬁrms would be on average of lower quality in
terms of unmeasured aspects of skills whereas those in small ﬁrms would be of higher quality.
The selection pattern is similar for both countries and consistent with earlier ﬁndings by Idson
and Feaster (1990) who used U.S. data from the May CPS for the year 1979.
The analysis of the size-wage gap decomposition shows that large ﬁrms tend to put more
weight on the valuation of measured skills than small ﬁrms do. This pattern is robust to
controlling for self selection, and in fact, once selectivity eﬀects are incorporated it appears
that rewards to measured skills constitute the main source of higher wages in large ﬁrms. This
ﬁnding combined with the result on the selection pattern is consistent with an explanation of
the diﬀerences in wage policies between large and small ﬁrms based on diﬀerences in monitoring
costs. A similar ﬁnding based on the National Longitudinal Survey for the year 1969 was found
in Garen (1985). The author compares the returns to education and IQ scores in large and
small ﬁrms and ﬁnd that large ﬁrms tend to reward more education than less directly observable
ability proxied by the IQ scores while small ﬁrms reward more ability than education.
Another result worth emphasizing is the similarity in the selection pattern for unionised
and non unionised workers in both countries. The similarity implies that the non random20
selection of workers into large and small employers seems to operate independently of the
non random selection associated with union and non union status. A more rigorous way of
testing these independent eﬀects would be to estimate and compare the eﬀects of the inverse
Mills ratio estimated from a multinomial selection equation with the four choices consisting
in unionised and non unionised workers in small and large companies. However the greater
number of choices available to workers complicates the task of deﬁning the process for workers
selection and identifying the diﬀerent inverse Mills ratios.21
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Table 1: Firm Size Wage Diﬀerentialsa, Canada-United States, 1998
Canadab (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Large Firm 0.200*** 0.135*** 0.105*** 0.089*** 0.076*** 0.023*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (.004) (0.004)
University 0.615*** 0.607*** 0.594*** 0.383*** 0.376*** 0.371***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Post secondary 0.334*** 0.327*** 0.320*** 0.223*** 0.219*** 0.204***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Secondary 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.201*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.127***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Union 0.137*** 0.106*** 0.137*** 0.129*** 0.080***






Constant 2.660*** 1.989*** 1.987*** 2.093*** 2.097*** 2.106*** 2.139***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Industry No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.04 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.49
United Statesb (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Large Firm 0.246*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.152*** 0.133***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
College 0.869*** 0.869*** 0.852*** 0.613***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Ass. College 0.550*** 0.549*** 0.520*** 0.363***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
High School 0.379*** 0.379*** 0.355*** 0.274***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Experience 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Union 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.079**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 2.477*** 1.505*** 1.505*** 1.408*** 1.320***
(0.007) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.009)
Industries No No No Yes Yes
Occupations No No No No Yes
R2 0.03 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.33
a-Based on a sample of 65921 observations for Canada and 25699 for the United States. Dependent variable
is log of hourly wages. Also includes experience squared. Standard Errors in parenthesis.
b- The omitted categories are no high school, small ﬁrms in natural resources related industry and job.24
Table 3: Wage Structure by Firm Sizea
Variablesb Canada USA
Interacted with Size Coeﬀ χ2-testc Coeﬀ χ2- testc
University
/ College Large 0.334*** 9.97 0.538*** 3.15
(0.014) (0.001) (0.022) (0.076)
Small 0.385*** 0.586***
Post Secondary (0.010) (0.018)
/ Asso. college Large 0.196*** 4.87 0.294*** 0.85
(0.012) (0.027) (0.024) (0.356)
Small 0.227*** 0.323***
Secondary (0.018) (0.021)
/ High School Large 0.128*** 2.28 0.202*** 2.80
(0.011) (0.131) (0.020) (0.094)
Small 0.149*** 0.243***
No Secondary (0.008) (0.014)
/ No High School Large 2.201*** 19.36 1.810*** 4.22
(0.022) (0.000) (0.032) (0.040)
Small 2.117*** 1.740***
(0.018) (0.028)
Experience Large 0.027*** 1.59 0.034*** 7.66
(0.001) (0.207) (0.001) (0.006)
Small 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.000) (0.001)
a-Based on a sample of 39225 observations for Qu´ ebec, Ontario and British Columbia and
25699 observations for the U.S.. Standard errors in parenthesis.
b-Dependent variable is log hourly wages. Estimations without constant term. Also includes
experience squared, industry, gender, marital status, public sector, union and occupation
dummies. The omitted industry and occupation categories are related to natural resources
activities.
c-Test of equality of slopes between large and small ﬁrms, p-value in parenthesis.25
Table 4a: Wage Structure by Firm Size, Non Unionised Firmsa
Variablesb Canada USA
Interacted with Size Coeﬀ χ2-testc Coeﬀ χ2- testc
University / College Large 0.436*** 5.30 0.487*** 0.28
(0.022) (0.012) (0.022) (0.597)
Small 0.380*** 0.501***
Post Secondary (0.013) (0.019)
/ Asso. college Large 0.267*** 2.48 0.255*** 0.16
(0.019) (0.115) (0.023) (0.689)
Small 0.232*** 0.242***
Secondary (0.010) (0.021)
/ High School Large 0.189*** 2.30 0.165*** 0.19
(0.019) (0.129) (0.020) (0.661)
Small 0.157*** 0.176***
No Secondary (0.010) (0.015)
/ No High School Large 2.01*** 3.64 1.902*** 0.68
(0.029) (0.056) (0.043) (0.409)
Small 2.06*** 1.874***
(0.022) (0.040)
Experience Large 0.034*** 13.12 0.030*** 8.29
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Small 0.027*** 0.023***
(0.000) (0.002)
Table 4b: Wage Structure by Firm Size, Unionised Firmsa
Variablesb Canada USA
Interacted with Size Coeﬀ χ2-testc Coeﬀ χ2- testc
University / College Large 0.259*** 20.38 0.345*** 0.94
(0.017) (0.000) (0.122) (0.332)
Small 0.353*** 0.486***
Post Secondary (0.016) (0.099)
/ Asso. college Large 0.155*** 4.18 0.142 2.65
(0.014) (0.041) (0.119) (0.104)
Small 0.192*** 0.397***
Secondary (0.012) (0.111)
/ High School Large 0.097*** 1.46 0.056 1.43
(0.013) (0.227) (0.108) (0.232)
Small 0.118*** 0.222***
No Secondary (0.012) (0.084)
/ No High School Large 2.603*** 31.25 2.081*** 0.22
(0.030) (0.000) (0.186) (0.642)
Small 2.436*** 1.974***
(0.029) (0.149)
Experience Large 0.021*** 2.76 0.024*** 0.10
(0.001) (0.096) (0.008) (0.751)
Small 0.024*** 0.020**
(0.001) (0.009)
a-The sample of non unionised workers has 23894 observations for Canada (Qu´ ebec,
Ontario and British Columbia) and 24524 for the U.S.. The sample of unionised workers
has 24856 observations for the Canadian provinces and 1175 for the U.S.
b-Dependent variable is log hourly wages. Estimations without constant term. Also
includes experience squared, industry, gender, marital status, public sector and
occupation dummies. The omitted industry and occupation categories are related to
natural resources activities.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX A1: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Sizea, (LFS 98)
Variables Total Large Firm Small Firm
( N = 69521) ( > 500 ) ( ≤ 500 )
Large Firm 33.3 1 0
Small Firm 66.7 0 1
Large Establishment - - -
Small Establishment - - -
Union 34.9 50.2 27.4
Public 18.4 31.1 12.0
University 20.2 26.9 16.9
Post Secondary 35.4 34.6 35.9
Secondary 29.6 28.3 30.3
No Secondary 14.8 10.2 16.9
Age 20-29 23.5 20.1 25.2
Age 30-39 31.0 29.9 31.6
Age 40-49 28.3 31.2 26.6
Age 50-65 17.2 18.8 16.6
Experience 20.5 21.0 20.2
Tenure (years) 7.6 9.4 6.7
Female 40.2 44.3 41.3
Married 65.2 69.5 66.5
Log(wage)b 2.73 2.86 2.67
a-Based on a sample of 69521 observations.
b-Hourly wages reported.31
APPENDIX A2: Descriptive Statistics by Firm Sizea, (CPS 98)
Variables Total Large Firm Small Firm
( N = 28121) ( > 500 ) ( ≤ 500 )
Large Firm 54.8 1 0
Small Firm 45.2 0 1
Large Establishment - - -
Small Establishment - - -
Union 5.1 6.2 2.4
Public 17.8 25.2 7.5
College 32.1 32.6 22.3
Associate college 9.2 9.6 9.1
High School 51.1 51.4 56.5
Less than HS 7.6 6.4 12.1
Age 20-29 19.5 17.7 21.5
Age 30-39 29.6 29.5 29.7
Age 40-49 28.7 30.1 27.2
Age 50-65 21.9 22.4 21.3
Experience 21.9 21.8 21.2
Female 40.2 44.8 39.2
Married 65.2 63.5 62.2
Log(wage)b 2.79 2.85 2.72
a-Based on a sample of 25812 observations.
b-hourly wages computed.32
APPENDIX B: Test of Validity of Exclusion Restrictions
The use of the interactions between a worker’s city size and industry as exclusion restrictions
implicitly assumes that the direct impact of city size on a worker’s wage should not diﬀer by industry.
That is for the average city size, there is no additional city size impact by industry. The next table
shows the results of a test of the validity of that assumption. The methodology consists in augmenting
a standard wage equation by adding interactions of a dummy for living in a large city (more than 500
thousand individuals) with the worker’s industry of employment. If, as assumed, city size does not
aﬀect workers’ wages diﬀerently across industries, these additional dummies should not be signiﬁcant.
Tables B.1 and B.2 show the results for the sample of non unionised and unionised workers.
Table B.1: Cross-Industry Eﬀects of Living in a Large Citya on (log) Hourly Wages
Non Unionised, Private Sectorb
Variablesc Canada USA
Coeﬀ F-testd F-testd Coeﬀ F- testd
Primary*Large City 0.070 ” -0.124
(0.049) (0.085)
Non Durable*Large City -0.118*** ” -0.131***
(0.024) (0.041)
Durable*Large City -0.113*** ” 0.019 ”
(0.024) (0.037)
Transport*Large City 0.007 ” -0.015 ”
(0.029) (0.043)
Trade (Retail Sale)*Large City 0.018 ” -0.043 ”
(0.024) (0.038)
Finance*Large City -0.006 ” 0.059 ”
(0.025) (0.041)
Services*Large City 0.007 ” 0.024 ”
(0.021) (0.035)
F-test All Industries 15.92 7.11
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
F-test partial 0.49 0.04 1.99
(p-value) (0.785) (0.842) (0.077)
a-Large city is deﬁned as a dummy equal to one for more than 500 thousands individuals in the U.S.
case and for Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal for Canada.
b-Based on a sample of 22287 observations for Canada (BC, QC and Ontario) and 20510 for the U.S.
c-Dependent variable is log hourly wages. Also includes education, a
quadratic in experience, gender, race, marital status, occupation, large city, large ﬁrm and industry
dummies. The omitted industry is trade wholesale.
d-Test of joint equality to zero of the interaction eﬀects.33
APPENDIX B (Continued): Test of Validity of Exclusion Restrictions
Table B.2 Within Industry Eﬀects of Living in a Large Citya on (log) Hourly Wages
Unionised Sectorb
Variablesc Canada USA
Coeﬀ F-testd Coeﬀ F- testd
Primary*Large City 0.039 ” -0.426* ”
(0.099) (0.245)
Non Durable*Large City -0.160*** ” -0.295 ”
(0.049) (0.201)
Durable*Large City -0.109** ” 0.162 ”
(0.047) (0.193)
Transport*Large City -0.043 ” -0.263 ”
(0.046) (0.192)
Trade (Retail Sale)*Large City -0.062 ” -0.257 ”
(0.053) (0.227)
Finance*Large City 0.048 ” 0.154 ”
(0.058) (0.253)
Services*Large City -0.066 ” -0.103 ”
(0.045) (0.189)
Government*Large City -0.045 ” 0.134 ”
(0.046) (0.199)
F-test All Industries 4.37 1.43
(p-value) (0.000) (0.190)
F-test partial 1.79 2.98
(p-value) (0.100) (0.084)
a-Large city is deﬁned as a dummy equal to one for more than 500 thousands individuals in the U.S.
case and for Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal for Canada.
b-Based on a sample of 15427 observations for Canada (BC, QC and Ontario) and 1175 for the U.S.
c-Dependent variable is log hourly wages. Estimations without constant term. Also includes education, a
quadratic in experience, gender, marital status, occupation and industry
dummies. The omitted industry is trade wholesale.
d-Test of joint equality of the interaction eﬀects.34
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